Tight Approximation Guarantees for Concave Coverage Problems by Barman, Siddharth et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
01
0.
00
97
0v
1 
 [c
s.D
S]
  2
 O
ct 
20
20
Tight Approximation Guarantees for
Concave Coverage Problems
Siddharth Barman∗ Omar Fawzi† Paul Fermé‡
Abstract
In the maximum coverage problem, we are given subsets T1, . . . , Tm of a universe [n] along with an
integer k and the objective is to find a subset S ⊆ [m] of size k that maximizes C(S) :=
∣∣⋃
i∈S Ti
∣∣. It
is a classic result that the greedy algorithm for this problem achieves an optimal approximation ratio
of (1− e−1).
In this work we consider a generalization of this problem wherein an element a can contribute by
an amount that depends on the number of times it is covered. Given a concave, nondecreasing function
ϕ, we define Cϕ(S) :=
∑
a∈[n]waϕ(|S|a), where |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|. The standard maximum
coverage problem corresponds to taking ϕ(j) = min{j, 1}. For any such ϕ, we provide an efficient
algorithm that achieves an approximation ratio equal to the Poisson concavity ratio of ϕ, defined
by αϕ := infx∈N
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(E[Poi(x)]) . Complementing this approximation guarantee, we establish a matching
NP-hardness result when ϕ grows in a sublinear way.
As special cases, we improve the result of [4] about maximum multi-coverage, that was based on
the unique games conjecture, and we recover the result of [11] on multi-winner approval-based voting
for geometrically dominant rules. Our result goes beyond these special cases and we illustrate it with
applications to distributed resource allocation problems, welfare maximization problems and approval-
based voting for general rules.
1 Introduction
Coverage functions are central objects of study in combinatorial optimization. Problems related to op-
timizing such functions arise in multiple fields, such as operations research [10], machine learning [14],
algorithmic game theory [12], and information theory [3]. The most basic covering problem is the max-
imum coverage one. In this problem, we are given subsets T1, . . . , Tm of a universe [n], along with a
positive integer k, and the objective is to find a size-k subset S ⊆ [m] that maximizes the coverage func-
tion C(S) :=
∣∣⋃
i∈S Ti
∣∣. A fundamental result in the field of approximation algorithms establishes that an
approximation ratio of 1− e−1 can be achieved for this problem in polynomial-time [16] and, in fact, this
approximation guarantee is tight, under the assumption that P 6= NP [13].
Note that in the maximum coverage problem, an element a ∈ [n] is counted at most once in the
objective, even if a appears in several selected sets. However, if we think of elements a ∈ [n] as goods
or resources, there are many settings wherein the utility indeed increases with the number of copies of a
that get accumulated. Motivated, in part, by such settings, we consider a generalization of the maximum
coverage problem where an element a can contribute by an amount that depends on the number of times
it is covered.
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Given a function ϕ : N → R+, an integer k ∈ N, a universe of elements [n], positive weights wa for
each a ∈ [n], and subsets T1, . . . , Tm ⊆ [n], the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem entails maximizing C
ϕ(S) :=∑
a∈[n]waϕ(|S|a) over subsets S ⊆ [m] of cardinality at most k; here |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|.
This work focuses on functions ϕ that are nondecreasing and concave (i.e., ϕ(i + 2) − ϕ(i + 1) ≤
ϕ(i + 1) − ϕ(i) for i ∈ N).1 We will also assume that the function ϕ is normalized in the sense that
ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1.2 Our approximation guarantees are in terms of the Poisson concavity ratio of ϕ,
which we define as follows
αϕ := inf
x∈N
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(E[Poi(x)])
= inf
x∈N
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(x)
. (1)
Here Poi(x) denotes a Poisson-distributed random variable with parameter x. We will write αϕ(x) :=
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(x) and, hence, αϕ = infx∈N αϕ(x).
Our main result is that the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem admits an efficient αϕ-approximation algo-
rithm, when ϕ is normalized nondecreasing concave, and this approximation guarantee is tight when ϕ
grows sublinearly. Formally,
Theorem 1. For any normalized nondecreasing concave function ϕ, there exists a polynomial-time αϕ-
approximation algorithm for the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem. Furthermore, for ϕ(n) = o(n), it is NP-hard
to approximate the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem within a factor better than αϕ+ε, for any constant ε > 0.
Before detailing the proof of the theorem, we provide a few remarks and connections to related work.
Applications and related work We can directly reduce the standard maximum coverage problem to
ϕ-MaxCoverage by setting ϕ(j) = min{j, 1}. In this case αϕ = 1 − e
−1. One can also encapsulate,
within our framework, the ℓ-MultiCoverage problem studied in [4] by instantiating ϕ(j) = min{j, ℓ}.
In this setting, we recover the approximation ratio αϕ = 1 −
ℓℓe−ℓ
ℓ! , which matches the approximation
guarantee obtained in [4] (see Proposition B.1). Note that the hardness result in [4] was based on the
Unique Games Conjecture, whereas the current work proves that this guarantee is tight under P 6= NP.
Another application of ϕ-MaxCoverage is in the context of multiwinner elections that entail selecting
k (out ofm) candidates with the objective of maximizing the cumulative utility of n voters; here, the utility
of each voter a ∈ [n] increases as more and more approved (by a) candidates get selected. One can reduce
multiwinner elections to a coverage problem by considering subset Ti ⊆ [n] as the set of voters that approve
of candidate i ∈ [m] and ϕ(j) as the utility that an agent achieves from j approved selections.3 Addressing
multiwinner elections in this standard utilitarian model, Dudycz et al. [11] obtain tight approximation
guarantees for some well-studied classes of utilities. Specifically, the result in [11] applies to the classic
proportional approval voting rule, which assigns a utility of
∑j
i=1
1
i
for j approved selections. This voting
rule corresponds to the coverage problem with ϕ(j) =
∑j
i=1
1
i
. Section 4.1 shows that Theorem 1 holds for
all the settings considered in [11] and, in fact, applies more generally. In particular, the voting version of
ℓ-MultiCoverage (studied in [22]) can be addressed by Theorem 1, but not by the result in [11]. Such
a separation also arises when one truncates the proportional approval voting rule to, say, ℓ candidates,
i.e., upon setting ϕ(j) =
∑min{j,ℓ}
i=1
1
i
. Given that multiwinner elections model multiple real-world settings
(e.g., committee selection [22] and parliamentary proceedings [5]), instantiations of ϕ-MaxCoverage in
such social-choice contexts substantiate the applicability of our algorithmic result.
1We require ϕ to be defined for nonnegative integers and will extend it over R+ by considering its piecewise linear
extension.
2One can always replace a generic ϕ to a normalized one without changing the optimal solutions through a simple affine
transformation.
3Indeed, for a subset of candidates S ⊆ [m], the utility of a voter a ∈ [n] is equal to ϕ(|S|a), with |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|.
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Coverage functions arise in numerous resource-allocation settings, such as sensor allocation [17], job
scheduling, and plant location [9]. The goal, broadly, in such setups is to select k subsets of resources
(out of m pre-specified ones) such that the welfare generated by the selected resources is maximized–each
resource’s contribution to the welfare increases with the number of times it is selected. This problem can
be cast as ϕ-MaxCoverage by setting n to be the number of resources, {Ti}i∈[m] as the given collection of
subsets, and ϕ(j) to be the welfare contribution of a resource when it is covered j times.4 Here, we mention
a specific allocation problem to highlight the relevance of studying ϕ beyond the standard coverage and ℓ-
coverage formulations (see Section 4.3 for details): in the Vehicle-Target Assignment problem [18, 20]
the resources are n targets and covering a target j times contributes ϕp(j) = 1−(1−p)
j
p
to the welfare; here,
p ∈ (0, 1) is a given parameter. Interestingly, we find that for this problem, the approximation ratio αϕ
we obtain can outperform the Price of Anarchy (PoA), which corresponds to the approximation ratio of
any algorithm where the agents selfishly maximize their utilities (see Section 4.3 for further discussion of
this point). This is to be contrasted with the resource allocation problem with ϕ(j) = min{j, ℓ} for which
it was shown in [7] that the Price of Anarchy matches with αϕ. Another allocation problem studied in
[20] corresponds to ϕ-MaxCoverage with ϕ(j) = jd, for a given parameter d ∈ (0, 1). We refer to this
instantiation as the d-Power function.
Theorem 1 gives us a tight approximation bound of αϕ for all the above-mentioned applications of
ϕ-MaxCoverage. The values of αϕ for these instantiations are listed in Table 1.
ϕ-MaxCoverage ϕ(j) αϕ Derivation
MaxCoverage min{j, 1} 1− e−1 Prop. B.1
ℓ-MultiCoverage min{j, ℓ} 1− ℓ
ℓe−ℓ
ℓ! Prop. B.1
Proportional Approval Voting
∑j
i=1
1
i
αϕ(1) ≃ 0.7965 . . . [11]
Proportional Approval Voting capped at 3
∑min{j,3}
i=1
1
i
αϕ(1) ≃ 0.7910 . . . Prop. A.9
p-Vehicle-Target Assignment 1−(1−p)
j
p
1−e−p
p
Prop. B.2
0.1-Vehicle-Target Assignment 1−(1−0.1)
j
0.1
1−e−0.1
0.1 ≃ 0.9516 . . . Prop. B.2
0.1-Vehicle-Target Assignment capped at 5 1−(1−0.1)
min{j,5}
0.1 αϕ(5) ≃ 0.8470 . . . Prop. A.9
d-Power jd 1
e
∑+∞
k=1
kd
k! Prop. B.3
Table 1: Tight approximation ratios for particular choices of ϕ in the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem.
Remarks on the Poisson concavity ratio αϕ By Jensen’s inequality along with the nonnegativity
and concavity of ϕ, we have that αϕ ∈ [0, 1]. We note that for an instance with m sets, one can obtain an
approximation ratio equal to minx∈[m] αϕ(x), which can be larger in some cases.
One can compare the approximation factor obtained here with the factor that comes from the notion
of curvature of submodular functions. In fact, if ϕ is nondecreasing and concave, then Cϕ is submodular.
One can show, via a direct calculation, that for submodular Cϕ the curvature (as defined in [8]) is given by
c = 1− (ϕ(m)−ϕ(m− 1)); see Proposition A.1. Therefore, the algorithm of Sviridenko et al. [23] leads to
an approximation ratio of 1−ce−1 for the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem. We note that the Poisson concavity
ratio αϕ is always greater or equal to this curvature-dependent ratio (Proposition A.3). Specifically, for
p-Vehicle-Target Assignment, it is strictly better for all p 6= 0, 1 and for ℓ-MultiCoverage, it
4Formally, to capture specific welfare-maximization problems in their entirety we have to a consider ϕ-MaxCoverage
with a matroid constraint, and not just bound the number of selected subsets by k. Details pertaining to matroid constraints
and the reduction appear in Section 2.1 and 4.2, respectively.
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is strictly better for all ℓ ≥ 2 as remarked in [4]. Therefore, for the setting at hand, the current work
improves the approximation guarantee obtained in [23].
Proof techniques and organization In Section 2, we present our approximation algorithm for the
ϕ-MaxCoverage. The algorithm is an application of pipage rounding, a technique introduced in [1], on
a linear programming relaxation of ϕ-MaxCoverage. We show that the multilinear extension Fϕ of Cϕ
is efficiently computable and thus, we can compute an integer solution xint from the optimal fractional
one x∗ satisfying Cϕ(xint) ≥ Fϕ(x∗). Using the notion of convex order between distributions, we show
that Fϕ(x∗) ≥
∑
a∈[n]waE[ϕ(Poi(|x
∗|a))], where |x|a =
∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
xi. Comparing this to the value∑
a∈[n]waϕ(|x
∗|a) taken by the linear program, we get a ratio given by the Poisson concavity ratio αϕ.
The concavity of ϕ is crucial at several steps of the proof: it guarantees that the natural relaxation can
be written as a linear program, it is used to relate between sums of Bernouilli random variables and a
Poisson random variable via the convex order, as well as for the fact that we can restrict the infimum in
the definition of αϕ to integer values of x. The generalization to matroid constraints follows in a standard
way and is presented in Section 2.1.
In Section 3, we present the hardness result for ϕ-MaxCoverage. For this, we define a generalization
of the partitioning gadget of Feige [13], extending also [4]. Roughly speaking, for an integer xϕ ∈ N, it is
a collection of xϕ-covers of the set [n] (an x-cover is a collection of subsets such that each element a ∈ [n]
is covered x times, or in other words, its ϕ-coverage is ϕ(x)n) that are incompatible in the sense that if
we take an element from each one of these xϕ-covers, then the ϕ-coverage is bounded approximately by
E[ϕ(Poi(xϕ))]n. Then, we construct an instance of ϕ-MaxCoverage from an instance of the NP-hard
problem Label Cover (as in [11]) using such a gadget with xϕ ∈ argminx∈Nαϕ(x). Having set up the
partitioning gadget, the analysis of the reduction can be obtained by carefully generalizing the reductions
of [4] and [11].
In Section 4, we present different domains of application of our result.
2 Approximation Algorithm for ϕ-MaxCoverage
Fix a function ϕ : N → R+ that is normalized, nondecreasing and concave. The ϕ-MaxCoverage
problem is defined as follows. The input to the problem is given by positive integers n,m, t and m subsets
T1, . . . , Tm of the set [n] (described as characteristic vectors), the weights wa ∈ N
∗ for a ∈ [n] (described
as a bitstring of length t), as well as an integer k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The output is a subset S ⊆ [m] of size
exactly k that maximizes Cϕ(S) =
∑
a∈[n]waϕ(|S|a), where |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|.
Note that the input to this problem can be specified using n(m + t) + O(log nmt) bits. To reduce
the number of parameters, we will assume that t is polynomial in n and m, so that a polynomial time
algorithm for this problem means an algorithm that runs in time polynomial in n and m. The counting
function ϕ is fixed and does not depend on the instance of the problem, but for a given instance the
problem only depends on the values ϕ(0), ϕ(1), . . . , ϕ(m). We assume that we have black box access to ϕ
and to ensure that all the algorithms run in polynomial time, we assume that ϕ(j) can be described with
a number of bits that is polynomial in j and that this description can be computed in polynomial time.
We now describe the approximation algorithm for ϕ-MaxCoverage that we analyze. As described
above, we follow the standard relax and round strategy, as in [4]. First, we define a natural convex
relaxation.
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Definition 2.1 (Relaxed program).
maximize
∑
a∈[n]
waca
subject to ca ≤ ϕ(|x|a),∀a ∈ [n], with |x|a :=
∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
xi
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [m]
m∑
i=1
xi = k .
(2)
As previously mentioned, ϕ is defined on R+ by extending it in a piecewise linear fashion on non-
integral points. As such, the constraint ca ≤ ϕ(|x|a) is equivalent to m linear constraints. In fact, we can
define ϕj to be the linear function ϕj(t) = (ϕ(j)− ϕ(j − 1))t− (j − 1)ϕ(j) + jϕ(j − 1) for j ∈ [m]. Since
ϕ is concave, we have that for all t ∈ [0,m], ϕ(t) = minj∈[m] ϕj(t). As such, the constraint ca ≤ ϕ(|x|a)
is equivalent to ca ≤ ϕj(|x|a) for all j ∈ [m] and so the program 2.1 is a linear program. Overall there
are n +m variables and (n + 1)m + 1 linear constraints, and by assumptions all the coefficients can be
described using a number of bits that is polynomial in n and m. Hence an optimal solution of this linear
program can be found in polynomial time.
Also observe that this program 2.1 is indeed a relaxation of the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem. To see
this, given a set S of size k, consider the characteristic vector x ∈ {0, 1}m defined by xi = 1 if and only
if i ∈ S. Then for all a ∈ [n], we can set ca = ϕ(|x|a) = ϕ(|S|a), and we get an objective value of∑
a∈[n]waϕ(|S|a) which is exactly C
ϕ(S). When solving the program 2.1, we get an optimal x∗ ∈ [0, 1]m
which is in general not integral. Next, we describe a method to round it to an integral vector xint ∈ {0, 1}m.
Rounding For a submodular function f : {0, 1}m → R , one can use pipage rounding [1, 25, 6] to
transform, in polynomial time, any fractional solution x ∈ [0, 1]m satisfying
∑m
i=1 xi = k into an integral
vector xint ∈ {0, 1}m such that
∑m
i=1 x
int
i = k and F (x
int) ≥ F (x), where F corresponds to the multilinear
extension of f , provided that F (x) is computable in polynomial time for a given x; see e.g., [25, Lemma
3.4]. The multilinear extension F : [0, 1]m → R of f is defined by F (x1, . . . , xm) := E[f(X1, . . . ,Xm)]
where Xi are independent random variables with Xi ∼ Ber(xi), i.e., Xi ∈ {0, 1} with P(Xi = 1) = xi.
Note that F (x) = f(x) for an integral vector x ∈ {0, 1}m.
We apply this strategy to Cϕ, which is shown to be submodular in Proposition A.1, and the solution
x∗ of the LP relaxation 2.1. Note that overall the algorithm is polynomial time, since here F (x) is
computable in polynomial time for a given x (see Proposition A.4). We now analyze the value returned
by the algorithm. Using the property of pipage rounding, with the notation X = (X1, . . . ,Xm) and
Ber(x) = (Ber(x1), . . . ,Ber(xm)), we get
Cϕ(xint) = EX∼Ber(xint)[C
ϕ(X)] ≥ EX∼Ber(x∗)[C
ϕ(X)] .
Then it suffices to relate EX∼Ber(x∗)[C
ϕ(X)] to the optimal value of the LP relaxation 2.1, which can only
be larger than the optimal value of the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem.
Theorem 2. Let x, c be a feasible solution of the program 2.1 and X ∼ Ber(x). Recalling the definition
of αϕ and αϕ(j) from (1), we have
EX∼Ber(x)[C
ϕ(X)] ≥
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
) ∑
a∈[n]
waca
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In particular, this implies that the described polynomial time algorithm has an approximation ratio of αϕ:
Cϕ(xint) ≥ αϕ
∑
a∈[n]
wac
∗
a ≥ αϕ max
S⊆[m]:|S|=k
Cϕ(S) .
In order to prove this theorem, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2. For ϕ concave, and p ∈ [0, 1]m, we have:
E
[
ϕ
( m∑
i=1
Ber(pi)
)]
≥ E
[
ϕ
(
Poi
( m∑
i=1
pi
))]
Proof. The notion of convex order discussed in [21] allows us to prove this result. We say that X ≤cx
Y ⇐⇒ E[f(X)] ≤ E[f(Y )] for any convex f . Thanks to Lemma 2.3 of [4], we have that for p ∈ [0, 1]:
Ber(p) ≤cx Poi(p)
Since this order is preserved through convolution (Theorem 3.A.12 of [21]), and the fact that
∑m
i=1 Poi(pi) ∼
Poi
(∑m
i=1 pi
)
, we have:
m∑
i=1
Ber(pi) ≤cx Poi
( m∑
i=1
pi
)
Applying this result to −ϕ, which is convex, concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. By linearity of expectation and the fact that the weights wa are positive, it is sufficient
to show that for all a ∈ [n]:
E[Cϕa (X)] ≥
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
)
ca ,
where Cϕa (S) := ϕ(|S|a). Note that |X|a =
∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
Xi, and thus:
E[Cϕa (X)] = E
[
ϕ
( ∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
Xi
)]
= E
[
ϕ
( ∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
Ber(xi)
)]
≥ E
[
ϕ
(
Poi
( ∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
xi
))]
thanks to Lemma 2.2
= E[ϕ(Poi(|x|a))] .
(3)
Furthermore, since x 7→ E[ϕ(Poi(x))] is concave thanks to Proposition A.6, if we write |x|a = λ⌊|x|a⌋ +
(1− λ)⌈|x|a⌉ for some λ ∈ [0, 1], we have
E[ϕ(Poi(|x|a))] ≥ λE[ϕ(Poi(⌊|x|a⌋))] + (1− λ)E[ϕ(Poi(⌈|x|a⌉))]
= λαϕ(⌊|x|a⌋)ϕ(⌊|x|a⌋) + (1− λ)αϕ(⌈|x|a⌉)ϕ(⌈|x|a⌉) by definition of αϕ(x)
≥
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
)
(λϕ(⌊|x|a⌋) + (1− λ)ϕ(⌈|x|a⌉)) since ⌊|x|a⌋ ≤ ⌈|x|a⌉ ≤ m
=
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
)
ϕ(|x|a) since ϕ linear between integer points
≥
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
)
ca .
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2.1 Generalization to Matroid Constraints
Instead of taking a cardinality constraint k on the size of the subset S, we look now at general matroid
constraints on S. Specifically, as input, instead of k, we take a matroid M defined on [m] and given by a
set of linear constraints describing its base polytope B(M). The output is a set S ∈ M that maximizes
Cϕ(S). Note that the cardinality constraint considered above is the special case where M is the uniform
matroid of all subsets of size at most k and the base polytope B(M) = {x ∈ [0, 1]m :
∑m
i=1 xi = k}.
We first note that in the order to establish Theorem 2, the cardinality constraint
∑m
i=1 xi = k is not
used. Thus, since the pipage rounding strategy applies to matroid constraints M (see [25, Lemma 3.4]),
the strategy and the analysis of its efficiency generalize immediately when applied to the following linear
program:
Definition 2.3 (Relaxed program for matroid constraints).
maximize
∑
a∈[n]
waca
subject to ca ≤ ϕ(|x|a),∀a ∈ [n]
0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [m]
x ∈ B(M) the base polytope of M .
(4)
Theorem 3. Let x, c a feasible solution of the program 2.3 and X ∼ Ber(x). Then:
EX∼Ber(x)[C
ϕ(X)] ≥
(
min
j∈[m]
αϕ(j)
) ∑
a∈[n]
waca .
In particular, this implies that the described polynomial time algorithm has an approximation ratio of αϕ:
Cϕ(xint) ≥ αϕ
∑
a∈[n]
wac
∗
a ≥ αϕ max
S∈M
Cϕ(S) .
3 Hardness of Approximation for ϕ-MaxCoverage
In this section, we establish an inapproximability bound for the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem with weights
1 under cardinality constraints. Throughout this section we use Γ to denote the universe of elements
and, hence, an instance of the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem consists of Γ, along with a collection of subsets
F = {Fi ⊆ Γ}
m
i=1 and an integer k. Recall that the objective of this problem is to find a size-k subset
S ⊆ [m] that maximizes Cϕ(S) =
∑
a∈Γ ϕ(|S|a).
We establish the following theorem in this section:
Theorem 4. It is NP-hard to approximate the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem for ϕ(n) = o(n) within a
factor greater that αϕ + ε for any ε > 0.
Our reduction is based on a problem called h-AryLabelCover, which is equivalent to the more
standard GapLabelCover problem as will be shown in Appendix C.
Definition 3.1 (h-AryLabelCover). An instance G = (V,E, [L], [R], {πe,v}e∈E,v∈e) of h-AryLabelCover
is characterized by an h-uniform regular hypergraph (V,E) and bijection constraints πe,v : [L]→ [R]. Here,
each h-uniform hyperedge represents a h-ary constraint. Additionally, for any labeling σ : V → [L], we
have the following notions of strongly and weakly satisfied constraints:
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• An edge e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E is strongly satisfied by σ if:
∀x, y ∈ [h], πe,vx(σ(vx)) = πe,vy(σ(vy))
• An edge e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E is weakly satisfied by σ if:
∃x 6= y ∈ [h], πe,vx(σ(vx)) = πe,vy(σ(vy))
Proposition 3.2 (δ, h-AryGapLabelCover). For any fixed integer h ≥ 2 and fixed δ > 0, there exists
an R0 such that for any integer R ≥ R0, it is NP-hard for instances G(V,E, [L], [R], {πe,v}e∈E,v∈e) of
h-AryLabelCover with right alphabet [R] to distinguish between:
YES: There exists a labeling σ that strongly satisfies all the edges.
NO: No labeling weakly satisfies more than δ fraction of the edges.
3.1 Partitioning System
The key ingredient to prove Theorem 4 is a constant size combinatorial object called partitioning system,
generalizing the work of Feige [13] and [4]. For any set [n], Q ⊆ 2[n], we overload the definition Cϕ(Q) :=∑
a∈[n] ϕ(|Q|a) with |Q|a := |{P ∈ Q : a ∈ P}| and C
ϕ
a (Q) := ϕ(|Q|a). Let us take xϕ ∈ argminx∈N∗αϕ(x),
thus αϕ = αϕ(xϕ).
5
We say that Q is an x-cover of x ∈ N if every element of [n] is covered x times, so Cϕ(Q) = nϕ(x).
Definition 3.3. An ([n], h,R, ϕ, η)-partitioning system consists of R distinct collections of subsets of [n],
P1, . . . ,PR ⊆ 2
[n], that satisfy
xϕn
h
∈ N, xϕ ≥ h and:
1. For every i ∈ [R],Pi is a collection of h subsets Pi,1, . . . , Pi,h ⊆ [n] each of size
xϕn
h
which is an
xϕ-cover.
2. For any T ⊆ [R] and Q = {Pi,j(i) : i ∈ T} for some function j : T → [h], we have
∣∣∣Cϕ(Q)− ψϕ|T |,hn
∣∣∣ ≤
ηn where:
ψϕk,h := E
[
ϕ
(
Bin
(
k,
xϕ
h
))]
. (5)
Remark. In particular, for any Q = {Q1, . . . , Qk} with Qi of size
xϕn
h
, we have that Cϕ(Q) ≤ nϕ(k xϕ
h
).
Indeed Cϕ(Q) =
∑
a∈[n] ϕ(|Q|a) with
∑
a∈[n] |Q|a =
∑
i∈[k] |Qi| = k×
xϕn
h
. By concavity of ϕ and Jensen’s
inequality, this function is maximized when all |Q|a are equals, where we get nϕ(k
xϕ
h
).
Proposition 3.4. For every choice of R,h ∈ N with h ≥ xϕ, η > 0, n ≥ η
−2Rϕ(R)2 log(20(h+ 1))
such that
xϕn
h
∈ N, there exists an ([n], h,R, ϕ, η)-partitioning system, which can be found in time
exp(Rnlogn).poly(h).
The proof can be found in Appendix D.
5Note that to make the notation lighter, we assumed that the infimum defining αϕ is achieved at some xϕ. If this is not
the case, for any ε > 0, we choose xϕ,ε such that αϕ(xϕ,ε) ≤ αϕ + ε and in the proof we replace all the occurrences of xϕ
with xϕ,ε.
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3.2 The Reduction
Proof of Theorem 4. Let ε > 0. We show that it is NP-hard to reach an approximation greater than
αϕ + ε for the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem, via a reduction from δ, h-AryGapLabelCover. We define
the following constants:
• η =
ϕ(xϕ)
4xϕ
ε,
• Let h ≥ xϕ be such that
∣∣∣ψϕh,h − αϕϕ(xϕ)
∣∣∣ ≤ η (see (5) for the definition of ψϕ); such a choice exists
thanks to Proposition A.5,
• Let θ be such that for all x ≥ θ, ϕ(x)
x
≤ η, which exists since ϕ(x) = o(x),
• ξ =
xϕ
θ
,
• δ = η2
ξ3
h2
.
For this choice of h and δ, we fix R ≥ h to be large enough for Proposition 3.2 to hold. Then given
an instance G = (V,E, [L], [R],Σ, {πe,v}e∈E,v∈e) of δ, h-AryGapLabelCover, we construct an instance
(Γ,F , k) of the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem with:
• n a large enough integer to have the existence of ([n], h,R, ϕ, η)-partitioning systems using Proposi-
tion 3.4. Note that the size of these partitioning systems is independent of the size of the instance
G, and that one can find one of those in constant time, with relation to the size of the instance G,
thanks to Proposition 3.4.
• Γ = [n]× E,
• k = |V |,
• We consider a ([n], h,R, ϕ, η)-partitioning system, and we call P = {P1, . . . ,PR} the corresponding
set of collections. We first define sets T
e,vj
β = Pπe,vj (β),j×{e} for e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E, j ∈ [h], β ∈ [L]
and we define F vβ :=
⊔
e∈E:v∈e T
e,v
β and F := {F
v
β , v ∈ V, β ∈ [L]}.
We will now prove that if we are in a YES instance, we have that there exists T of size k such
that Cϕ(T ) ≥ ϕ(xϕ)|Γ| (completeness). Moreover, if we are in a NO instance, then we have that for
all T of size k = |V |, Cϕ(T ) ≤ (αϕ + ε)ϕ(xϕ)|Γ| (soundness). Establishing these two properties would
conclude the proof. In fact, an algorithm for ϕ-MaxCoverage achieving a factor strictly greater than
αϕ + ε would allow us to decide whether we have YES or a NO instance of the NP-hard problem δ, h-
AryGapLabelCover.
In order to achieve this, let us define Cϕ,e :=
∑
a∈[n]×{e}C
ϕ
a . In particular, Cϕ =
∑
a∈Γ C
ϕ
a =∑
e∈E C
ϕ,e. For T ⊆ F , we define the relevant part of T on e by
Te := {T
e,v
β : v ∈ e, β ∈ [L], F
v
β ∈ T } = {F
v
β ∩ ([n]× {e}), F
v
β ∈ T }
Note that Cϕ,e(T ) = Cϕ,e(Te), and in particular C
ϕ(T ) =
∑
e∈E C
ϕ,e(Te).
3.2.1 Completeness
Suppose the given h-AryLabelCover instance G is a YES instance. Then, there exists a labeling
σ : V 7→ [L] which strongly satisfies all edges. Consider the collection of |V | subsets T := {F v
σ(v) : v ∈ V }.
Fix e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E. Since e is strongly satisfied by σ, there exists r ∈ [R] such that πe,vi(σ(vi)) = r for
all i ∈ [h]. Thus, Te = {T
e,vi
σ(vi)
}i∈[h] = {Pr,i×{e}}i∈[h] is an xϕ-cover of [n]×{e}, and so C
ϕ,e(Te) = nϕ(xϕ).
Thus Cϕ(T ) =
∑
e∈E C
ϕ,e(Te) = |E|ϕ(xϕ)n = ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|.
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3.2.2 Soundness
Suppose the given h-AryLabelCover instance G is a NO instance. Let us prove the contrapositive of
the soundness: we suppose that there exists T of size k = |V | such that Cϕ(T ) > (αϕ + ε)ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|. Let
us show that there exists a labelling σ that weakly satisfies a strictly larger fraction of the edges than δ.
For every vertex v ∈ V , we define L(v) := {β ∈ [L] : F vβ ∈ T } to be the candidate set of labels that can
be associated with the vertex v. We extend this definition to hyperedges e = (v1, . . . , vh) where we define
L(e) :=
⋃
i∈[h]L(vi) to be the multiset of all labels associated with the edge. Note that |Te| = |L(e)|.
We say that e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E is consistent if and only if ∃x 6= y ∈ [h], πe,vx(L(vx))∩πe,vy(L(vy)) 6= ∅.
We then decompose E in three parts:
• B is the set of edges e ∈ E with |L(e)| ≥ h
ξ
.
• N is the set of consistent edges e ∈ E with |L(e)| < h
ξ
.
• I = E − (B ∪N) is the set of inconsistent edges e ∈ E with |L(e)| < h
ξ
.
We want to show that the contribution of N is not too small, which we will use to construct a labelling
weakly satisfying enough edges. First, we will need the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5.
∑
e∈E |L(e)| = |E|h
Proof. Recall that our h-uniform hypergraph is regular; call d its regular degree. In particular, we have
that d|V | = |E|h. Note also that
∑
v∈V |L(v)| = |T | = |V |. Thus:
∑
e∈E
|L(e)| =
∑
e∈E
∑
v∈V :v∈e
|L(v)| =
∑
v∈V
∑
e∈E:v∈e
|L(v)| = d
∑
v∈V
|L(v)| = d|V | = |E|h (6)
Next we show that the contribution of B to the coverage can be bounded efficiently:
Lemma 3.6.
∑
e∈B C
ϕ,e(Te) ≤
ε
4ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|.
Proof. We have:
∑
e∈B
Cϕ,e(Te) ≤
∑
e∈B
nϕ
(
|L(e)|
xϕ
h
)
by the remark on Definition 3.3 and |Te| = |L(e)|
≤ |B| × nϕ
(∑
e∈B |L(e)|
|B|
xϕ
h
)
by Jensen’s inequality on concave ϕ
≤ |B| × nϕ
( |E|h
|B|
xϕ
h
)
since ϕ nondecreasing and
∑
e∈B
|L(e)| ≤ |E|h by Lemma 3.5
=
ϕ
( |E|xϕ
|B|
)
|E|xϕ
|B|
xϕ|Γ| .
(7)
We have seen that
∑
e∈B |L(e)| ≤ |E|h, but
∑
e∈B |L(e)| ≥ |B|
h
ξ
by definition of B, so we have that
|B|
|E| ≤ ξ. Thus
|E|xϕ
|B| ≥
xϕ
ξ
= θ. By definition of θ, we get that
∑
e∈B C
ϕ,e(Te) ≤ ηxϕ|Γ| =
ε
4ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|.
In order to bound the contribution of I, we will prove a property on inconsistent edges:
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Proposition 3.7. Let e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ E be an inconsistent hyperedge with respect to T . Then we
have that
∣∣∣Cϕ,e(Te)− ψϕ|L(e)|,hn
∣∣∣ ≤ ηn.
Proof. Since e is inconsistent, ∀x 6= y ∈ [h], πe,vx(L(vx)) ∩ πe,vy(L(vy)) = ∅. Therefore, for every i ∈ [R],
there is at most one v ∈ e such that i ∈ πe,v(L(v)), i.e., Te intersects with Pi × {e} in at most one subset.
This gives us a subset T ⊆ [R] and a function j : T → [h] such that Te = {Pi,j(i) × {e} : i ∈ T}. As
a consequence, |T | = |Te| = |L(e)| and by the second condition of the partitioning system, we get the
expected result.
Now, we can bound the contribution of I:
Lemma 3.8.
∑
e∈I C
ϕ,e(Te) ≤ (αϕ +
ε
2 )ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|.
Proof. Thanks to Proposition 3.7, we have:
∑
e∈I
Cϕ,e(Te) ≤
∑
e∈I
(ψϕ|L(e)|,h + η)n ≤
∑
e∈E
(ψϕ|L(e)|,h + η)n , (8)
since I ⊆ E and ψϕ|L(e)|,h ≥ 0. But
∑
e∈E |L(e)| = |E|h by Lemma 3.5 and x 7→ ψ
ϕ
x,h is concave thanks to
Proposition A.7, so we can use Jensen’s inequality to get
∑
e∈E ψ
ϕ
|L(e)|,h ≤ |E|ψ
ϕ
∑
e∈E |L(e)|
|E|
,h
= |E|ψϕh,h and
thus: ∑
e∈I
Cϕ,e(Te) ≤ (ψ
ϕ
h,h + η)n|E| ≤ (αϕϕ(xϕ) + 2η)|Γ| , (9)
by definition of h. This implies that the total contribution of inconsistent edges I is at most
∑
e∈I C
ϕ,e(Te) ≤
(αϕϕ(xϕ) + 2η)|Γ| ≤ (αϕ +
ε
2)ϕ(xϕ)|Γ| by definition of η.
Lemma 3.9.
|N |
|E| ≥ ξη
Proof. Since we have supposed that
∑
e∈E C
ϕ,e(Te) = C
ϕ(T ) > (αϕ + ε)ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|, and with the help of
Lemmas 3.6 and 3.8, we have that the contribution of N is:
∑
e∈N
Cϕ,e(Te) >
ε
4
ϕ(xϕ)|Γ|
However, we have that for e ∈ N that Cϕ,e(Te) ≤ nϕ
(
|Te|
xϕ
h
)
= nϕ
(
|L(e)|xϕ
h
)
≤ nϕ
(
xϕ
ξ
)
≤ nxϕ
ξ
thanks to the remark on definition 3.3 and the bound |L(e)| < h
ξ
. This implies that:
|N |
|E|
≥
ξ
xϕ
εϕ(xϕ)
4
= ξη .
Finally, we construct a randomized labeling σ : V 7→ [L] as follows: for v ∈ V , if L(v) 6= ∅, set σ(v)
uniformly form L(v), otherwise set it arbitrarily. We claim that in expectation, this labeling must weakly
satisfy δ fraction of the hyperedges.
To see this, fix any e = (v1, . . . , vh) ∈ N . Thus ∃x 6= y ∈ [h], πe,vx(L(vx)) ∩ πe,vy(L(vy)) 6= ∅.
Furthermore |L(vx)|, |L(vy)| ≤
h
ξ
. Thus, we have that πe,vx(L(vx)) = πe,vy(L(vy)) with probability at least
1
|L(vx)||L(vy)|
≥
(
ξ
h
)2
.
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Therefore:
EσEe∼E[σ weakly satisfies e]
≥ ξηEσEe∼E[σ weakly satisfies e|e ∈ N ] by Lemma 3.9
>
η
2
ξ3
h2
= δ .
(10)
In particular there exists some labeling σ such that Ee∼E[σ weakly satisfies e] > δ, and thus the
soundness is also proved.
4 Applications
This section shows that instantiations of ϕ-MaxCoverage encapsulate and generalize multiple problems
from fields such as computation social choice and algorithmic game theory.
4.1 Multiwinner Elections
As mentioned previously, multiwinner elections (with a utilitarian model for the voters) entail selection
of k (out of m) candidates that maximize the utility across n voters. Here, the utility of each voter
a ∈ [n] increases with the number of approved (by a) selections. The work of Dudycz et al. [11] study
the computational complexity of such elections and, in particular, address classic voting rules in which—
for a specified sequence of nonnegative weights (w1, w2, . . .)—voter a’s utility is equal to
∑j
i=1wi, when
she approves of j candidates among the selected ones. One can view this election exercise as a coverage
problem by considering subset Ti ⊆ [n] as the set of voters that approve of candidate i ∈ [m] and
ϕ(j) =
∑j
i=1 wi. Indeed, for a subset of candidates S ⊆ [m], the utility of a voter a ∈ [n] is equal to
ϕ(|S|a), with |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|.
Dudycz et al. [11] show that if the weights satisfy w1 ≥ w2 ≥ . . . (i.e., bear a diminishing returns
property) along with geometric dominance (wi wi+2 ≥ w
2
i+1 for all i ∈ N
∗) and limi→∞wi = 0, then a
tight approximation guarantee can be obtained for the election problem at hand. Note that the diminishing
returns property implies that ϕ(j) =
∑j
i=1 wi is concave and limi→∞wi = 0 ensures that ϕ is sublinear
(see Proposition A.8). Hence, Theorem 1 can be invoked to recover the result in [11]. In fact, Theorem 1
does not require geometric dominance among the weights and, hence, applies to a broader class of voting
rules. For instance, the geometric dominance property does not hold if one considers the voting weights
induced by ℓ-MultiCoverage, i.e., wi = 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, and wj = 0 for j > ℓ. However, using
Theorem 1, we get that for this voting rule we can approximate the optimal utility within a factor of
αϕ = 1 −
ℓℓe−ℓ
ℓ! (see Proposition B.1). Another example of such a separation arises if one truncates the
proportional approval voting. The standard proportional approval voting corresponds to wi =
1
i
, for all
i ∈ N (equivalently, ϕ(j) =
∑j
i=1
1
i
) and falls within the purview of [11]. While the truncated version with
ϕ(j) =
∑min{j,ℓ}
i=1
1
i
, for a given threshold ℓ, does not satisfy geometric dominance, Theorem 1 continues to
hold and provide a tight approximation ratio that can be computed easily (see Proposition A.9 and Table
1 for examples).
4.2 Resource Allocation in Multiagent Systems
A significant body of prior work in algorithmic game theory has addressed game-theoretic aspects of
maximizing welfare among multiple (strategic) agents; see, e.g., [20]. Complementing such results, this
section shows that the optimization problem underlying multiple welfare-maximization games can be
expressed in terms of ϕ-MaxCoverage.
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Specifically, consider a setting with n resources, k agents, and a (counting) function ϕ : N 7→ R+. Every
agent i is endowed with a collection of resource subsets Ai = {T
i
1, . . . , T
i
mi
} ⊆ 2[n] (i.e., each T ij ⊆ [n]).
The objective is to select a subset Ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ [k], so as to maximize W
ϕ(A1, A2, . . . , Ak) :=∑
a∈[n]wa ϕ(|A|a). Here, wa ∈ R+ is a weight associated with a ∈ [n] and |A|a := |{i ∈ [k] : a ∈ Ai}|. We
will refer to this problem as the ϕ-Resource Allocation problem.
While ϕ-Resource Allocation does note directly reduce to ϕ-MaxCoverage, the next theorem
shows that it corresponds to maximizing ϕ-coverage functions subject to a matroid constraint. Hence,
invoking our result from Section 2.1, we obtain a tight αϕ-approximation for ϕ-Resource Allocation
(see Appendix E for the proof):
Theorem 5. For any normalized nondecreasing concave function ϕ, there exists a polynomial-time αϕ-
approximation algorithm for ϕ-Resource Allocation. Furthermore, for ϕ(n) = o(n), it is NP-hard to
approximate ϕ-Resource Allocation within a factor better than αϕ + ε, for any constant ε > 0.
4.3 Vehicle-Target Assignment
Vehicle-target assignment [18, 20] is another problem which highlights the applicability of coverage prob-
lems, with a concave ϕ. In particular, vehicle-target assignment can be directly expressed as ϕ-Resource
Allocation: the [n] resources correspond to targets, the agents correspond to vehicles i ∈ [k], each with a
collection of covering choices Ai ⊆ 2
[n], and ϕp(j) = 1−(1−p)
j
p
, for a given parameter p ∈ (0, 1). Since ϕp(j)
is concave, by Proposition B.2 and Theorem 5, we obtain a novel tight approximation ratio of αϕp =
1−e−p
p
for this problem. Also, one can look at the capped version of this problem, ϕpℓ (j) := ϕ
p(min(j, ℓ)). In
particular, we recover the ℓ-MultiCoverage function when p = 0. In Figure 1, we have plotted several
cases of the tight approximations αϕp
ℓ
in function of ℓ for several values of ℓ:
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
p
αϕp∞
αϕp1αϕp2αϕp3αϕp4αϕp5
Figure 1: Tight approximation ratios αϕp
ℓ
, where ℓ is the rank of the capped version of the p-Vehicle-
Target Assignment problem. When p = 0, we recover the ℓ-coverage problem.
Paccagnan and Marden [20] study the game-theoretic aspects of vehicle-target assignment. A key goal
in [20] is to bound the welfare loss incurred due to strategic selection by the k vehicles, i.e., the selection
of each Ai ∈ Ai by a self-interested vehicle/agent i ∈ [k]. The loss is quantified in terms of the Price of
Anarchy (PoA). Formally, this performance metric is defined as ratio between the welfare of the worst-
possible equilibria and the optimal welfare. Paccagnan and Marden [20] show that, for computationally
tractable equilibrium concepts (in particular, for coarse correlated equilibria), tight price of anarchy bounds
can be obtained via linear programs.
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Note that our hardness result (Theorem 1) provides upper bounds on PoA of tractable equilibrium
concepts–this follows from the observation that computing an equilibrium provides a specific method for
finding a coverage solution. In [7] and in the particular case of the ℓ-MultiCoverage problem, it is shown
that this in fact an equality, i.e., PoA = αϕ if ϕ(j) = min{j, ℓ} for all values of ℓ. However, numerically
comparing the approximation ratio for vehicle-target assignment, αϕp =
1−e−p
p
, with the optimal PoA
bound, we note that αϕp can in fact be strictly greater than the PoA guarantee; see Figure 2.
Another form of the current problem, considered in [20], corresponds to ϕd(j) = jd, for a given param-
eter d ∈ (0, 1). We refer to this instantiation as the d-Power function and for it obtain the approximation
ratio αϕd = e
−1
∑+∞
k=1
kd
k! (Proposition B.3). In this case, the question whether the inequality PoA ≤ αϕ
is tight remains open; see Figure 3.
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αϕp =
1−e−p
p
PoA20
Curv = 1− c
e
Figure 2: Comparison between the PoA and αϕ for the Vehicle-Target Assignment problem. Using
the linear program found in [20], we were able to compute the blue curve PoA20, the Price of Anarchy of
this problem for m = 20 players. Since the PoA only decreases when the number of players grows, this
means that PoA < αϕ in that case. As a comparison, the red curve Curv depicts the general approximation
ratio (see [23]) obtained for submodular function with curvature c, with c = 1− ϕp(m) + ϕp(m− 1) here.
4.4 Welfare Maximization for ϕ-Coverage
Maximizing (social) welfare by partitioning items among agents is a key problem in algorithmic game
theory; see, e.g., the extensive work on combinatorial auctions [19]. The goal here is to partition t items
among a set of k agents such that the sum of values achieved by the agents—referred to as the social
welfare—is maximized. That is, one needs to partition [t] into k pairwise disjoint subsets A1, A2, . . . , Ak
with the objective of maximizing
∑k
i=1 vi(Ai). Here, vi(S) denotes the valuation that agent i has for a
subset of items S ⊆ [t].
When each agent’s valuation vi is submodular, a tight (1−e
−1)-approximation ratio is known for social
welfare maximization [25]. This section shows that improved approximation guarantees can be achieved
if, in particular, the agents’ valuations are ϕ-coverage functions. Towards a stylized application of such
valuations, consider a setting in which each “item” b ∈ [t] represents a bundle (subset) of goods Tb ⊆ [n] and
the value of an agent increases with the number of copies of any good a ∈ [n] that get accumulated. Indeed,
if each agent’s value for j copies of a good is ϕ(j), then we have a ϕ-coverage function and the overall
optimization problem is find a k-partition, A1, A2, . . . , Ak, of [t] that maximizes
∑k
i=1
(∑
a∈[n] ϕ (|Ai|a)
)
,
where |Ai|a := {b ∈ Ai : a ∈ Tb}.
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Figure 3: Comparison between the PoA and αϕ for the d-Power problem. Using the linear program found
in [20], we were able to compute the blue curve PoA20, the Price of Anarchy of this problem for m = 20
players. Here, the question whether the inequality PoA ≤ αϕ is tight remains open. As a comparison, the
red curve Curv depicts the general approximation ratio (see [23]) obtained for submodular function with
curvature c, with c = 1− ϕd(m) + ϕd(m− 1) here.
In the current setup, one can obtain an αϕ approximation ratio for social-welfare maximization by
reducing this problem to ϕ-coverage with a matroid constraint, and applying the result from Section 2.1.
Specifically, we can consider a partition matroid over the universe [t]× [k]: for a bundle/item b ∈ [t] and an
agent i ∈ [k], the element (b, i) in the universe represents that bundle b is assigned to agent i, i.e., b ∈ Ai.
The partition-matroid constraint is imposed to ensure that each bundle b is assigned to at most one agent.
Furthermore, we can create k copies of the underlying set of goods [n] and set T(b,i) := {(a, i) : a ∈ Tb}
to map the ϕ-coverage over the universe to the social-welfare objective. This, overall, gives us the desired
αϕ approximation guarantee.
Conclusion
We have introduced the ϕ-MaxCoverage problem where having c copies of element a gives a value ϕ(c).
We have shown that when ϕ is normalized, nondecreasing and concave, we can obtain an approximation
guarantee given by the Poisson concavity ratio αϕ := infx∈N
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(E[Poi(x)]) and we showed it is tight for
sublinear functions ϕ. The Poisson concavity ratio strictly beats the bound one gets when using the
notion of curvature submodular functions, except in very special cases such as MaxCoverage where the
two bounds are equal.
An interesting open question is whether there exists combinatorial algorithms that achieve this ap-
proximation ratio. As mentioned in [4], for the ℓ-MultiCoverage with ℓ ≥ 2, which is the special case
where ϕ(x) = min(x, ℓ), the simple greedy algorithm only gives a 1 − e−1 approximation ratio, which is
strictly less than the ratio αϕ = 1−
ℓℓe−ℓ
ℓ! in that case.
Another open question is whether the hardness result remains true even when ϕ(n) 6= o(n).
A good example is given by ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1+ t) = 1+ ct with c ∈ (0, 1). We know that the problem
is hard for c = 0 but easy for c = 1. One can show that the approximation ratio achieved by our algorithm
is αϕ = 1 −
c
e
in that case (which is the same approximation ratio obtained from the curvature in [23]),
but the tightness of this approximation ratio remains open.
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A General properties
In this section, we will assume that ϕ : N → R+ is nondecreasing concave and normalized (ϕ(0) = 0 and
ϕ(1) = 1).
Proposition A.1. Cϕ is submodular, its curvature is at most c = 1− (ϕ(m) − ϕ(m− 1)) and it cannot
be improved for a general instance with m cover sets.
Proof. We use the following lemma which is trivial to prove:
Lemma A.2 (Properties of |S|a = |{i ∈ S : a ∈ Ti}|.). We have:
1. |S|a ≤ |S|
2. |S ∪ S′|a ≤ |S|a + |S
′|a. In particular, if S ⊆ T then |S|a ≤ |T |a and |S ∪ {x}|a ≤ |S|a + 1.
3. If S ⊆ T , x 6∈ T then |S|a = |T |a ⇒ |S ∪ {x}|a = |T ∪ {x}|a
Let us show first the submodularity of Cϕ. Let S ⊆ T ⊆ [m] and x 6∈ T :
Cϕ(S ∪ {x}) −Cϕ(S)− (Cϕ(T ∪ {x})− Cϕ(T )) =
=
∑
a∈[n]
wa[ϕ(|S ∪ {x}|a)− ϕ(|S|a)− (ϕ(|T ∪ {x}|a)− ϕ(|T |a))]
(11)
Let us call g(a) := ϕ(|S ∪ {x}|a)− ϕ(|S|a)− (ϕ(|T ∪ {x}|a)− ϕ(|T |a)):
1. If |T |a = |S|a then thanks to Lemma A.2, we have that |T ∪ {x}|a = |S ∪ {x}|a, so g(a) = 0
2. Else, we have that |T |a > |S|a:
(a) If |S ∪ {x}|a = |S|a, then we add elements of T − S using Lemma A.2 to get that |T ∪ {x}|a =
|T |a, so g(a) = 0 in that case.
(b) Else |S ∪ {x}|a 6= |S|a. So with |S|a = k, we get that |S ∪ {x}|a = k + 1 and |T |a > |S|a so
|T |a ≥ k + 1.
i. If |T ∪ {x}|a = |T |a, then g(a) = ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k) ≥ 0 since ϕ is nondecreasing.
ii. Else |T ∪ {x}|a 6= |T |a so with |T |a = ℓ with ℓ ≥ k + 1, we get that |T |a = ℓ + 1. So we
have that:
g(a) = ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k) − (ϕ(ℓ + 1)− ϕ(ℓ))
=
ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k)
(k + 1)− k
−
ϕ(ℓ+ 1)− ϕ(ℓ)
(ℓ+ 1)− ℓ
≥ 0
(12)
by concavity of ϕ: its slopes are nonincreasing.
So in all cases, we have g(a) ≥ 0 so Cϕ(S∪{x})−Cϕ(S)−(Cϕ(T ∪{x})−Cϕ(T )) ≥ 0: Cϕ is submodular.
Let us now compute its curvature:
c = 1− min
i∈[m]
Cϕ([m])− Cϕ([m]− {i})
Cϕ({i}) −Cϕ(∅)
18
Let i ∈ [m] fixed:
Cϕ([m])− Cϕ([m]− {i})
Cϕ({i}) − Cϕ(∅)
=
∑
a∈[n]wa[ϕ(|[m]|a)− ϕ(|[m]− {i}|a)]∑
a∈[n]wa[ϕ(|{i}|a)− ϕ(|∅|a)]
=
∑
a∈Ti
wa[ϕ(|[m]|a)− ϕ(|[m]− {i}|a)]∑
a∈Ti
wa
=
∑
a∈Ti
wa[ϕ(|[m]|a)− ϕ(|[m]|a − 1)]∑
a∈Ti
wa
since a ∈ Ti .
(13)
But |[m]|a ≤ m and ϕ concave, so ϕ(|[m]|a)) − ϕ(|[m]|a − 1) ≥ ϕ(m) − ϕ(m − 1) for all a ∈ [n]. As a
consequence we have that:
Cϕ([m]) −Cϕ([m]− {i})
Cϕ({i}) − Cϕ(∅)
≥ ϕ(m)− ϕ(m− 1)
and this lower bound is true for its minimum over i. Thus we get that c ≤ 1− (ϕ(m) − ϕ(m− 1)). Also
one can find instances for all m such that this bound is tight: take T1 = {a} and ∀j ∈ [m], a ∈ Tj for
instance.
Proposition A.3. The approximation ratio αϕ is always better than the general ratio given in [23]:
minx∈[m] αϕ(x) ≥ 1− ce
−1 with 1− c = ϕ(m)− ϕ(m − 1). Furthermore, we have always that αϕ(0) = 1,
so the minimum range in the definition of αϕ can be taken on positive integers only.
Proof. We first suppose that x ≥ 1. Also, we can ask that for all j ≥ m, we have ϕ(j + 1) − ϕ(j) =
ϕ(m) − ϕ(m − 1), since these quantities are never achieved in a instance with m cover sets. So we can
suppose that for all j we have ϕ(j + 1)− ϕ(j) ≥ ϕ(m)− ϕ(m− 1). Also for k ≥ 1, one can write:
ϕ(k) =
k−1∑
j=0
ϕ(j + 1)− ϕ(j) = 1 +
k−1∑
j=1
ϕ(j + 1)− ϕ(j) .
Thus:
E[ϕ(Poi(x))] = e−x
+∞∑
k=1
ϕ(k)
xk
k!
= e−x
+∞∑
k=1
(
1 +
k−1∑
j=1
ϕ(j + 1)− ϕ(j)
)xk
k!
= e−x
[
(ex − 1) +
+∞∑
k=1
( k−1∑
j=1
ϕ(j + 1)− ϕ(j)
)xk
k!
]
≥ (1− e−x) + e−x
+∞∑
k=1
(k − 1)[ϕ(m) − ϕ(m− 1)]
xk
k!
= (1− e−x) + [1− c]e−x
(
x
+∞∑
k=1
xk−1
(k − 1)!
−
+∞∑
k=1
xk
k!
)
= (1− e−x) + [1− c]e−x
(
xex − (ex − 1)
)
= 1− e−x + [1− c](x − 1 + e−x) =: f(x) .
(14)
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But since ϕ(x) ≤ x and with g(x) := f(x)
x
, we get that g′(x) = c
x2
(x − 1 + e−x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 1, thus
g(x) ≥ g′(1) and then
αϕ(x) ≥
f(x)
ϕ(x)
≥ g(x) ≥ g(1) = f(1) ,
with f(1) = 1− e−1 + (ϕ(m) − ϕ(m− 1))e−1 the approximation ratio of the general algorithm.
Let us now suppose that x ∈ [0, 1]. We have that ϕ(x) = x on that interval since we have taken its
piecewise linear extension and ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ(1) = 1. Thus we have that
αϕ(x) =
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
x
= e−x
+∞∑
k=1
ϕ(k)
k
xk−1
(k − 1)!
and we can then compute its value at 0: αϕ(0) = e
−0
∑+∞
k=1
ϕ(k)
k
0k−1
(k−1)! =
ϕ(1)
1
00
0! = 1. Since αϕ(x) ≤ 1, we
have that αϕ = infx∈N∗ αϕ(x).
Proposition A.4. Let F (x) := EX∼x[C
ϕ(X)] for x ∈ {0, 1}m. We have an explicit formula for F :
F (x) =
n∑
a=1
m∑
k=0
[ 1
m+ 1
m∑
ℓ=0
ω−ℓkm+1
∏
j∈[m]:a∈Tj
(1 + (ωℓm+1 − 1)xj)
]
ϕ(k) with ωm+1 := exp
(
2iπ
m+ 1
)
Thus, F is computable in polynomial time in n and m.
Proof. Recall that Cϕ(S) =
∑n
a=1 C
ϕ
a (S), so by linearity of expectation we can focus on EX∼x[C
ϕ
a (X)].
But Cϕa (X) = ϕ(|X|a) where |X|a = |{i ∈ [m] : Xi = 1 and a ∈ Ti}| ∈ [0,m]. Thus:
EX∼x[C
ϕ
a (X)] =
m∑
k=0
PX∼x(|X|a = k)ϕ(k)
It remains to compute the distribution of |X|a. But |X|a =
∑
i∈[m]:a∈Ti
Xi and Xi ∼ Ber(xi). Thus,
|X|a ∼ Poi Bin((xi)i∈[m]:a∈Ti), which is known as the Poisson binomial law. Thanks to [15], we have that:
PX∼x(|X|a = k) =
1
m+ 1
m∑
ℓ=0
ω−ℓkm+1
∏
j∈[m]:a∈Tj
(1 + (ωℓm+1 − 1)xj)
where ωm+1 := exp
(
2iπ
m+1
)
, and the result is proved.
Proposition A.5. We have that
|E[ϕ(Bin(n, x/n))]− E[ϕ(Poi(x))]| ≤
xϕ(n)
2n
+
xn+1
n!
.
In particular when ϕ(n) = o(n):
lim
n→∞
E[ϕ(Bin(n, xϕ/n))] = E[ϕ(Poi(xϕ))] = αϕϕ(xϕ) .
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Proof. Thanks to [24, 2], we have that the total variation distance between Bin(n, x/n) and Poi(x) is
bounded in the following way:
∆(Bin(n, x/n),Poi(x)) ≤
1− e−x
2x
n ∗
(x
n
)2
≤
x
2n
Thus with B ∼ Bin(n, x/n) and P ∼ Poi(x):
|E[ϕ(B)]− E[ϕ(P )]| =
∣∣∣∣∣
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)P(B = k)−
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)P(P = k)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)(P(B = k)− P(P = k))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)|P(B = k)− P(P = k)|
≤ ϕ(n)∆(Bin(n, x/n),Poi(x))
+
+∞∑
k=n+1
ϕ(k)P(P = k)
≤
xϕ(n)
2n
+ e−x
+∞∑
k=n+1
k
xk
k!
since ϕ(k) ≤ k
=
xϕ(n)
2n
+ xe−x
+∞∑
k=n
xk
k!
≤
xϕ(n)
2n
+
xn+1
n!
→
n→∞
0 when ϕ(n) = o(n)
(15)
by a standard upper bound on the remainder of the exponential series.
Proposition A.6. The function g : x 7→ E[ϕ(Poi(x))] on R+ is C∞ nondecreasing concave.
Proof. Since we have that 0 ≤ ϕ(k) ≤ k for k ∈ N, in particular g(x) = e−x
∑+∞
k=0 ϕ(k)
xk
k! is C
∞. It is thus
enough to compute its first and second derivatives:
g′(x) = − e−x
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)
xk
k!
+ e−x
+∞∑
k=1
ϕ(k)e−xk
xk−1
k!
= − e−x
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k)
xk
k!
+ e−x
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(k + 1)e−x
xk
k!
= e−x
+∞∑
k=0
(ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k))
xk
k!
.
(16)
But ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k) ≥ 0 since ϕ nondecreasing, so g′(x) ≥ 0 and g is nondecreasing.
The calculus of g′′ is the same where we replace ϕ by ψ(k) := ϕ(k+1)−ϕ(k) which is a nonincreasing
function by concavity of ϕ. Thus:
g′′(x) = e−x
+∞∑
k=0
(ψ(k + 1)− ψ(k))
xk
k!
≤ 0
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since ψ(k + 1)− ψ(k) ≤ 0, and so g is concave.
Proposition A.7. The function gq : n 7→ E[ϕ(Bin(n, q))] defined on N is nondecreasing concave. As
a consequence, one can uses Jensen’s inequality on the piecewise linear extension of gq which is also
continuous.
Proof. Bin(n, q) ≤st Bin(n+1, q) and we have that ϕ is nondecreasing, so E[ϕ(Bin(n, q))] ≤ E[ϕ(Bin(n+
1, q))], ie gq(n+ 1)− gq(n) ≥ 0: gq is nondecreasing.
We show then the concavity, ie. gq(n+2)− gq(n+1) ≤ gq(n+1)− gq(n). Call ψ(x) = ϕ(x+1)−ϕ(x)
which is nonincreasing since ϕ concave. Let us take Xk,q ∼ Bin(k, q). Then:
gq(n+ 1) = E[ϕ(Xn+1,q)]
=
n∑
i=0
E[ϕ(Xn,q +X1,q)|Xn,q = i]P(Xn,q = i)
=
n∑
i=0
E[ϕ(i +X1,q)− ϕ(i)]P(Xn,q = i)
+
n∑
i=0
ϕ(i)P(Xn,q = i)
=
n∑
i=0
E[ϕ(i +X1,q)− ϕ(i)]P(Xn,q = i) + gq(n)
(17)
Thus:
gq(n+ 1)− gq(n) =
n∑
i=0
E[ϕ(i+X1,q)− ϕ(i)]P(Xn,q = i)
=
n∑
i=0
q(ϕ(i + 1)− ϕ(i))P(Xn,q = i)
= qE[ψ(Bin(n, q))]
(18)
Then thanks to the fact that Bin(n, q) ≤st Bin(n + 1, q) and ψ is nonincreasing, we have that
E[ψ(Bin(n, q))] ≥ E[ψ(Bin(n+ 1, q))], ie. gq(n+ 2)− gq(n+ 1) ≤ gq(n+ 1)− gq(n).
Proposition A.8. With wi := ϕ(i) − ϕ(i− 1), we have:
lim
i→+∞
wi = 0 ⇐⇒ ϕ(n) = o(n)
Proof. (⇒) Let ǫ > 0, let us find a rank N such that for n ≥ N , ϕ(n)
n
≤ ǫ. Let N0 the rank from which
wi ≤
ǫ
2 and N1 the rank from which
1
n
∑N0−1
i=1 wi ≤
ǫ
2 . We have
ϕ(n)
n
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi ≤
1
n
N0−1∑
i=1
wi +
1
n
n−1∑
i=N0
ǫ
2
≤
ǫ
2
+
ǫ
2
= ǫ for n ≥ max(N0, N1) =: N
(19)
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(⇐) Since wi = ϕ(i)−ϕ(i−1) is nonnegative and nonincreasing (respectively because ϕ is nondecreasing
and concave), then the sequence w has a limit L ≥ 0. But
ϕ(n)
n
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi ≥ L .
Since the left hand side tends to 0 by hypothesis, this means that L = 0.
Proposition A.9. If ∀x ≥ ℓ, ϕ(x) = ϕ(ℓ) > 0, then αϕ(x) is nondecreasing from ℓ to +∞ and αϕ(x) =
ϕ(ℓ)−e−x
∑ℓ−1
k=0(ϕ(ℓ)−ϕ(k))
xk
k!
ϕ(x) . In particular, αϕ = minx∈[ℓ] αϕ(x), and the argmin can be found numerically.
Proof. Let x ≥ ℓ, then:
αϕ(x) =
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(x)
=
e−x
∑+∞
k=0 ϕ(k)
xk
k!
ϕ(ℓ)
=
e−x
∑ℓ−1
k=0(ϕ(k) − ϕ(ℓ))
xk
k! + ϕ(ℓ)
ϕ(ℓ)
.
In particular, thinking of x as a real number, αϕ(x) is differentiable and:
α′ϕ(x) = −
e−x
ϕ(m)
ℓ−1∑
k=0
(ϕ(k) − ϕ(ℓ))
xk
k!
+
e−x
ϕ(ℓ)
m−2∑
k=0
(ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(ℓ))
xk
k!
=
e−x
ϕ(ℓ)
ℓ−1∑
k=0
(ϕ(k + 1)− ϕ(k))
xk
k!
≥ 0 since ϕ nondecreasing .
(20)
Thus αϕ(x) is nondecreasing from ℓ to +∞ and the result on αϕ follows.
B Calculations of αϕ
Proposition B.1. For ℓ ∈ N∗ and ϕ(j) = min(j, ℓ), we have that αϕ = 1−
ℓℓe−ℓ
ℓ! .
Proof. Thanks to Proposition A.3, we have that αϕ = infx∈N∗ αϕ(x). Let us compute E[ϕ(Poi(x))]:
E[ϕ(Poi(x))] = e−x
+∞∑
k=0
ϕ(x)
xk
k!
= e−x
ℓ∑
k=0
k
xk
k!
+ e−x
+∞∑
k=ℓ+1
ℓ
xk
k!
= e−xx
ℓ−1∑
k=0
xk
k!
+ ℓe−x
+∞∑
k=ℓ+1
xk
k!
= e−x
[
(x− ℓ)
ℓ−1∑
k=0
xk
k!
− ℓ
xℓ
ℓ!
]
+ ℓe−x
+∞∑
k=0
xk
k!
= ℓ− e−x
[ xℓ
(ℓ− 1)!
− (x− ℓ)
ℓ−1∑
k=0
xk
k!
]
.
(21)
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Let us show that αϕ(x) takes its minimum in ℓ, where we have indeed:
αϕ(ℓ) =
1
ℓ
(
ℓ− e−ℓ
[ ℓℓ
(ℓ− 1)!
− (ℓ− ℓ)
ℓ−1∑
k=0
ℓk
k!
])
= 1− e−ℓ
ℓℓ
ℓ!
.
Thanks to proposition A.9, αϕ(x) is nondecreasing from ℓ to +∞. Suppose now that ℓ ≥ 2 (otherwise
the result is already proved). Since αϕ(x) is differentiable, we have for 1 ≤ x ≤ ℓ:
α′ϕ(x) = −
ℓ
x2
+ e−x
[ xℓ−1
(ℓ− 1)!
−
ℓ−1∑
k=0
xk
k!
+ ℓ
ℓ−2∑
k=0
xk
(k + 1)!
+
ℓ
x
]
− e−x
[ xℓ−2
(ℓ− 2)!
−
ℓ−2∑
k=0
xk
k!
+ ℓ
ℓ−3∑
k=0
xk
(k + 2)k!
−
ℓ
x2
]
=
ℓ
x
(
e−x
(
1 +
1
x
)
−
1
x
)
+ e−x
[( ℓ
ℓ− 1
− 1
) xℓ−2
(ℓ− 2)!
+ ℓ
ℓ−3∑
k=0
( xk
(k + 1)!
−
xk
(k + 2)k!
)]
=
ℓ
x
(
e−x
(
1 +
1
x
)
−
1
x
)
+ e−x
[ xℓ−2
(ℓ− 1)!
+ ℓ
ℓ−3∑
k=0
xk
k!
( 1
k + 1
−
1
k + 2
)]
=
ℓ
x
(
e−x
(
1 +
1
x
+
xℓ−1
ℓ!
+ x
ℓ−3∑
k=0
xk
k!
1
(k + 1)(k + 2)
)
−
1
x
)
=
ℓe−x
x2
((
1 + x+
xℓ
ℓ!
+
ℓ−3∑
k=0
xk+2
(k + 2)!
)
− ex
)
=
ℓe−x
x2
( ℓ∑
k=0
xk
k!
− ex
)
≤ 0
(22)
since the partial sum of the exponential series is bounded by its total sum. Thus αϕ(x) is nonincreasing
from 1 to ℓ, and nondecreasing after, so it takes indeed its minimum in ℓ and the proposition is proved.
Proposition B.2. For p ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ(j) = 1−(1−p)
j
p
, we have that αϕ =
1−e−p
p
.
Proof. By definition:
αϕ(x) =
E[ϕ(Poi(x))]
ϕ(x)
=
∑+∞
k=0 ϕ(k)e
−x xk
k!
ϕ(x)
=
1− e−x
∑+∞
k=0(1− p)
k xk
k!
pϕ(x)
=
1− e−xe(1−p)x
pϕ(x)
=
1− e−px
pϕ(x)
.
(23)
If x ≥ 1, αϕ(x) =
1−e−px
1−(1−p)x =
1−e−px
1−e−qx
with q = ln
(
1
1−p
)
> 0 and:
α′ϕ(x) =
pe−px(1− e−qx)− qe−qx(1− e−px)
(1− e−qx)2
=
pe−px − qe−qx + (q − p)e−(p+q)x
(1− e−qx)2
.
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Let us take t = p
q
∈ (0, 1), since q = ln
(
1
1−p
)
> p > 0, x1 = −px and x2 = −(p + q)x. Then by strict
convexity of the exponential function, we have:
etx1+(1−t)x2 < tex1 + (1− t)ex2 =
pe−px + (q − p)e−(p+q)x
q
.
But tx1 + (1− t)x2 =
−p2x
q
+ −(q−p)(p+q)x
q
= −p
2x
q
+ −(q
2x−p2x)
q
= −qx, so we get:
pe−px − qe−qx + (q − p)e−(p+q)x > 0 .
and α′ϕ(x) > 0. Thus, αϕ(x) increases from 1 to infinity and takes its minimum in 1:
αϕ = αϕ(1) =
1− e−p
p
.
Proposition B.3. For d ∈ (0, 1) and ϕ(j) = jd, we have that αϕ = e
−1
∑+∞
k=1
kd
k!
Proof. We have for x ≥ 1:
αϕ(x) =
E[Poi(x)d]
ϕ(x)
=
e−x
∑+∞
k=0 k
d xk
k!
ϕ(x)
= e−x
+∞∑
k=0
kd
xk−d
k!
.
Then:
α′ϕ(x) = − αϕ(x) + e
−x
+∞∑
k=1
(k − d)kd
xk−d−1
k!
= − αϕ(x) + e
−x
+∞∑
k=0
(k + 1− d)(k + 1)d
xk−d
(k + 1)!
= − αϕ(x) + e
−x
(
(1− d)x−d +
+∞∑
k=1
(k + 1− d)(k + 1)d−1
xk−d
k!
)
= e−xx−d
(
1− d+
+∞∑
k=1
(
k + 1− d
k + 1
(k + 1)d − kd)
xk
k!
)
.
(24)
But the function f(k) = k+1−d
k+1 (k + 1)
d − kd is positive on R∗+, so we get that α
′
ϕ(x) > 0 for x ≥ 1,
thus αϕ(x) is increasing from 1 to +∞, so αϕ = αϕ(1) = e
−1
∑+∞
k=1
kd
k! .
C NP-hardness of δ, h-AryGapLabelCover
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We reduce from the Label Cover problem described in [11] which is known to be
an NP-hard problem. The main idea of this reduction is the usual equivalence between bipartite graphs
and hypergraphs.
Definition C.1. A Label Cover instance L = (A,B,E, [L], [R], {πe}e∈E) consists of a bi-regular bipartite
graph (A,B,E) with right degree t, alphabet sets [L], [R] and for every edge e ∈ E, a constraint πe : [L]→
[R]. A labelling of L is a function σ : A → [L]. We say that σ strongly satisfies a right vertex v ∈ B if
for every two neighbours u, u′ of v, we have π(u,v)(σ(u)) = π(u′,v)(σ(u
′)). Moreover, we say that σ weakly
satisfies a right vertex v ∈ B if there exists two neighbours u, u′ of v such that π(u,v)(σ(u)) = π(u′,v)(σ(u
′)).
25
Theorem C.2 (δ-Gap-Label-Cover(t, R) from [11]). For any fixed integer t ≥ 2 and fixed δ > 0, there ex-
istsR0 such that for any integer R ≥ R0, it is NP-hard for Label Cover instances L = (A,B,E, [L], [R], {πe}e∈E)
with right degree t and right alphabet [R] to distinguish between:
YES: There exists a labeling σ that strongly satisfies all the right vertices.
NO: No labeling weakly satisfies more than δ fraction of the right vertices.
The reduction is the following. From δ-Gap-Label-Cover(t, R), we take h = t and the same parameters
δ,R. Given an instance L = (A,B,E, [L], [R], {πe}e∈E), we take G = (A,E
′, [L], [R], {π′e′ ,v}e′∈E′,v∈e′)
with E′ = {N(b), b ∈ B} with N(b) the set of neighbours of b in L, and π′e′,v = π
′
N(b),v := πv,b since
v ∈ N(b). Since (A,B,E) is bipartite and biregular, we get that our hypergraph has all hyperedges of
size h = |N(b)| = t, and that it is regular from the regular left degree of (A,B,E). By construction, the
notion of weakly and strongly satisfied is the same in both cases, as well as the labellings, and thus we
have the NP-hardness of δ, h-AryGapLabelCover.
D Proof of existence of partitioning systems
Proof of Proposition 3.4. The existential proof is based on the probabilistic method. We take Pi an h-
equi-sized uniform random xϕ-cover of [n]. Hence in the collection Pi = (Pi,1, . . . , Pi,h), each of the h
subsets is of cardinality
xϕn
h
. Write P = (P1, . . . ,PR). We have that for any a ∈ [n],P(a ∈ Pi,j) =
xϕ
h
.
Note that these events are independent for different is.
By construction, the first condition is fulfilled. Let us prove the second one.
Fix T ⊆ [R] and Q := {Pi,j(i) : i ∈ T} for some function j : T → [h]. We have for a ∈ [n]:
E[Cϕa (Q)] = E[ϕ(|Q|a)] = E[ϕ(
∣∣{i ∈ T : a ∈ Pi,j(i)}∣∣)]
But the random variables {Xi := 1a∈Pi,j(i)}i∈T are independent andXi ∼ Ber(
xϕ
h
), soX :=
∣∣{i ∈ T : a ∈ Pi,j(i)}∣∣ =∑
i∈T Xi ∼ Bin(|T |,
xϕ
h
), and thus:
E[Cϕa (Q)] = E[ϕ(Bin(|T |,
xϕ
h
))] = ψϕ|T |,h
Since |Q|a ≤ |Q| ≤ R and ϕ nondecreasing, we have 0 ≤ C
ϕ
a (Q) ≤ ϕ(R) and we can apply Azuma-
Hoeffding bound on Cϕ(Q) =
∑
a∈[n]C
ϕ
a (Q):
P
(∣∣∣Cϕ(Q)− ψϕ|T |,hn
∣∣∣ > ηn) ≤ 2exp(− ( η
ϕ(R)
)2
n
)
Since there are at most (h+ 1)R choices of T and Q, a union bound gives:
P
(
∃C,Q :
∣∣∣Cϕ(Q)− ψϕ|T |,hn
∣∣∣ > ηn) ≤ 2(h + 1)Rexp(− ( η
ϕ(R)
)2
n
)
Thus with probability at least 9/10, we have that
∣∣∣Cϕ(Q) − ψϕ|T |,hn
∣∣∣ ≤ ηn, since we have taken n ≥
η−2Rϕ(R)2 log(20(h + 1)). So there must exists some choice of P that satisfies the first and second con-
straints of partitioning systems. Thus, we can enumerate over all choices of P in time exp(Rnlogn).poly(h)
to find such a partitioning system.
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E Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. We show that ϕ-Resource Allocation corresponds to ϕ-MaxCoverage under a matroid
constraint. Given an instance of ϕ-Resource Allocation, consider the partition matroid M on
[
∑
i∈[k]mi] := [m1] + . . . + [mk], where (Bi)i∈[k] := ([mi])i∈[k] is a partition of the ground set and the
cardinality constraint for each i is to di = 1.
Here, I ⊆ [
∑
i∈[k]mi] is an independent set of the matroid iff |I ∩Bi| ≤ di = 1, for all i ∈ [k]. This
corresponds to each agent i ∈ [k] selecting at most one element from the available mi choices. In other
words, we have a bijection f between tuples (A1, . . . , Ak) ∈ A1 × . . . × Ak and maximal independent
sets (bases) of M such that Wϕ(A) = Cϕ(f(A)). Therefore, Theorem 3 leads to a polynomial-time
αϕ-approximation algorithm for ϕ-Resource Allocation.
For the hardness part of the theorem, the proof is exactly the same as in Theorem 4, but instead of
F := {F vβ , v ∈ V, β ∈ [L]} and k = |V |, we take k = |V | to be the number of agents andAi := {F
vi
β , β ∈ [L]}
where V = {v1, . . . , vk}. Hence, instead of subsets of F of size k, we only consider one set F
v
β ∈ F , for
each v ∈ V . The function we maximize in the reduction remains unchanged.
To establish completeness, we note that the subset described is already of the right form and, hence,
the arguments continue to hold. For proving soundness, the constraint on the shape of the subset of F only
helps us, since it gives more constraints on the given subset from which we want to construct a labelling.
Therefore, both parts of the proof work and the NP-hardness follows.
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